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Time to reflect: a strategy for reducing risk in structural design 
 
Iain A MacLeod 
Professor Emeritus,  University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
The use of computers has resulted in immensely beneficial changes both, at the operational level of 
doing design and at the conceptual level of making us think more carefully about the processes that 
we use and how they should be used. 
   However there is much disquiet about the risks involved in their use.  Hazards, that may lead to 
faults including disasters include: 
x tŚĞŶƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ?DƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ
process may be automated requiring little input from the user. Designers become deskilled.  
Their understanding of design contexts is reduced. 
x There is misplaced confidence in the potential of the software to produce outcomes that will be 
fit for purpose. 
x Innovation will be stifled. 
 
A main strategy for guarding against such risk is to use what is called the reflective approach1. This 
implies that one adopts a degree of scepticism about all received and generated information; one is 
open to ideas; one poses and seeks answers to questions; one makes personal assessments and 
reassessments and seeks advice from others, especially from experts; second or more opinions are 
sought if appropriate;  when faults are found or improvements can be made, action is taken; an 
appropriate amount of resource is allocated to seek to ensure reliable outcomes. 
     Use of reflective thinking is fundamental to good engineering practice.  Computer use does not 
diminish the need for it.  
 
Cases 
Two cases of failures that illustrate the risks and the potential role of reflective thinking in avoiding 
them are dicussed. 
 
Large panel construction for buildings 
In the 1960s, structural designers in the UK used Code of Practice CP 114 
Design of Reinforced Concrete Buildings for the technical assessment of  
large panel buildings.  Many of these designers did not ask the question: 
 ?Does CP114 address all the issues that need to be considered for the 
design of large panel buildings that are constructed using precast wall 
ĂŶĚĨůŽŽƌƉĂŶĞůƐ ? ?dŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĂƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂƌĞƐŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ?EŽ ?.  
CP114 was written mainly for cast in situ beam and column structures;  
important issues for large panel buildings, particularly about how the 
panels should be connected, were not addressed in the code and hence 
in many, if not most, of the designs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequences of this lack of reflective thinking included: 
Figure 1  The failed 
Ronan Point Building 
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x A major structural failure causing 4 deaths (The Ronan Point Collapse). 
x High cost of retrofitting existing buildings that were found to be unsafe. 
x Long term pause in the use of a construction method that has advantages for some types of 
building. 
 
 
/Ŷ&ŝŐƵƌĞ ? ?Ă ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?Đan be considered as one with which the design team is wholly 
familiar and there is no innovation; ĐŽĚĞƐŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĨƵůůǇĂƉƉůǇ ?Ŷ ?ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ŝƐŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚ
involves any degree of innovation and/or issues that are unfamiliar to the design team. Safety-
critical situations are also in the uncertain domain. The designers of large panel buildings in the 
1960s did not realise that they were working in a context exemplified by Figure 2(b).  They were not 
asking the right questions.  
 
 
The Sleipner Platform Collapse 
In 1991 a large concrete oil recovery platform - Figure 3(a) - was close to completion in a Norwegian 
Fjord when a loud bang was heard and the structure sank to the sea floor  W a total loss.  The fault 
ǁĂƐƚƌĂĐĞĚƚŽƐŚĞĂƌĨĂŝůƵƌĞŝŶĂ ?ƚƌŝĐĞůů ?ǁall - Figure 3(b) - at a the bottom of the structure.  The 
system had been modelled using 3D finite elements (FE) - Figure 3(c) - the results from which were 
used for assessment of the shear strength of the wall.  Questions that could/should have been asked 
include: 
x Is the model that I am using  more complex than is appropriate?  The designers of the Slepiner 
Platform assumed that that because they were using a complex model that it would necessarily 
give adequate predictions.  In the case of the tricell wall, bending theory would have resulted in 
much better predictions of bending moment and shear force than from the model used. 
x Is the mesh of elements used adequate for the purpose?  A review of the FE mesh in the area 
that triggered the collapse - Figure 3(c) - by a person experienced in FE modelling could have 
prompted an investigation of the accuracy of the mesh for predicting bending actions. 
x Can I do a simple check calculation?  Figure 3(d) shows a calculation, on the  back of an 
envelope, based on treating  a 1m depth of the tricell wall as a beam withstanding a 67m 
hydrostatic pressure head.  The predicted shear is 3 times the allowable. 
The consequence of failing to ask and respond to such questions was a financial loss of over $700m 
 
 
 
(a)  Standard context 
Scope of code 
of practice 
Design 
context   
Scope of code 
of practice 
Design 
context   
(b) Uncertain context 
context Figure 2 Applicability of codes of 
practice  
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The Design Process 
At its most basic level, the design process includes the following activities/stages:  
x Inception  Where information about the context is gathered and the requirements are 
established.  
x Conception  Where a set of conceptual designs/options are identified and assessed against the 
requirements leading to a decision about the design solution 
x Production  Where the information needed to create the entity is established. 
x Review   This is the reflective activity that is pervasive in the process 
 
In structural engineering this process can be applied to the structural system as a whole or to a part 
or to details.   
       
While the process may be mainly linear as shown in Figure 1, it can be deeply iterative, e.g. in 
product design, a prototype may be manufactured, tested, modified, re-tested and so on. 
    Traditionally 'structural design' meant the use of code of practice rules to ensure that the system 
and its parts would perform satisfactorily. The term is now used for the process of synthesising and 
assessing the whole of the design information for a structure.  It is better to  refer to assessment 
using codes etc. as technical assessment. Technical assessment is sometimes required at the concept 
design stage to assess options but it is mainly used in the production stage of design.   
    It is said that if bad decisions are made at the concept stage, no amount of good detailing can 
rescue the situation. The need for reflective thinking at all stages of the design process is therefore 
 Figure 3 The Sleipner Platform collapse 
(b) Plan of part of 
the FE mesh 
(d) Back of an envelope calculation 
(a) The platform 
prior to collapse 
(c) The FE model 
of the system 
Tricell wall 
Inception Conception Production 
Review    
Figure 4 Basic design process 
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evident.  However it is errors in technical assessment that have the greatest potential to result in 
major failures/disasters.  Therefore this area  is of the greatest concern in seeking to ensure that 
computer use is satisfactory. 
 
Technical Assessment  
 
Main processes in technical assessment are: 
x Model development process   ,ĞƌĞƚŚĞ ?ŵŽĚĞů ?ŝƐƚŚĞƐĞƚŽĨƌƵůĞƐthat need to be addressed 
(normally code of practice rules). The main reflective question at the model development stage 
ŝƐ ?Have all the relevant issues been addressed and are the rules used adequate for this 
purpose? ?  This is the validation question.  In standard design contexts not much resource needs 
to be applied to model development but with innovation, posing the  validation question is a key 
issue. It was here that the designers of large panel buildings in the 1960s made their main errors.  
The fault that caused the collapse of the Sleipner Platform lay in the decision about what 
analysis model to use. 
x Solution Process  i.e. doing the calculations.  Reflective questions here include:  Is the software 
ƌĞůŝĂďůĞ ? ? ?ƌĞƚŚĞŝŶƉƵƚǀĂůƵĞƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ? ? 
x Output assessment   Here the main reflective question is:   ?Has the model been correctly 
implemented? ?  This is the verification  question. 
Figure 5 is a diagram of the predictive modelling process.  Technical assessment rules are predictive 
in the sense that they are used to assess future performance of the structure.  In this diagram the 
rectangular boxes are sub-processes and the oval boxes can be considered to be states. The system 
model  is the full set of information about the entity being designed. The engineering model is that 
part of the system model that requires technical assessment. 
               
 
                      Figure 5  The modelling process 
 
There is concern in the profession that for the implementation of many Eurocode provisions, such as 
complex combinations of loadcases, computer processing is the only feasible strategy. Some people 
see this necessity as leading to a dangerous  ?black box ? mode of operation where designers become 
dissociated from the calculations. Such a mode of operation is unacceptable. A reflective ethos must 
be adopted.  Rather than see computational power as a threat, it must be harnessed to support 
improved design in, for example, ĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĂƚŝĨ ? ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚďĞƚƚĞƌ support in the 
investigation of options  
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Analysis modelling 
The analysis model is the mathematical representation of the behaviour of the structure. The 
analysis modelling process1,2,3,4  has the same form as illustrated for technical assessment in Figure 5.  
It is a sub process of technical assessment. The validation question is:  ?Is the analysis model capable 
of satisfying the requirements? ? 
    In traditional engineering education, analysis modelling, i.e. structural analysis, was treated as a 
dominant issue.  Students learned to do time consuming calculations by hand.  Now engineers do 
not do complex hand calculations.  Some people are of the opinion that this results in a decline in 
understanding of behaviour but the accuracy and efficiency of computer processing means that 
complex hand calculations are in the past.  We must therefore look to other sources for 
understanding of structural behaviour.  Computer use is seen as the problem; in reality it is the 
solution.  Responding  to reflective questions using analysis software can significantly enhance 
understanding of behaviour.   
   For example suppose, if you were accustomed to analysing braced frames for buildings you may 
observe that a frame of this type, under uniformly distributed lateral load,  tends to deflect as in 
Figure 6(a).  Then you solve for a similar, but moment resisting, frame with no diagonal bracing and 
find that the lateral deflection is as in Figure 6(b).  A natural reaction is to think that you have made 
an error.  To respond to this reflective question, you do some experimentation by varying the 
stiffnesses of the members of the frame. This leads to the conclusion that there is a fundamental 
difference in how the two types of frame resist lateral load.  You find out what characterises the 
difference.  Your learning about behaviour improves significantly. Using such knowledge then 
informs improvement in design decisions. 
   People say that in modern practice there is little time for such reflection. But if a structural 
designer is operating outside the standard envelope (Figure 2(b)), the risk in not being reflective is 
unacceptable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structural Failures 
While the scope of what we define as structural design is, as it should be, much wider than in the 
past , the risk of failure is still a dominant issues. The track record for preventing major failures in the 
UK is very good but the risk will always be present.  Reflective thinking is a key strategy in controlling 
such risk. Table 1 lists seven major failures and their root causes.  None of the causes listed are 
related to errors in doing the calculations.    The faults all occurred at the model development stage 
of design; in each case the validation question was not properly addressed.  Very few major failures 
Figure 6  Lateral displacement of frames 
(a)  With diagonal 
bracing 
(b)  No bracing 
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are attributable to errors of the doing calculations. This does not mean that errors in calculations are 
not made nor that improvements in methods for identifying them should not be sought. 
 
Table 1  Root causes of some major failures 
Incident Reason for failure 
Tay Rail Bridge collapse 1879 Inadequate provisions for wind loading, neglect of 
known good practice for detailing of connections 
Cleddau (Milford Haven) Bridge 
collapse 1970  
Buckling of diaphragms not included in theanalysis 
model 
Ronan Point building collapse 1968 Code of practice used did not address important issues 
for the type of structure 
Hartford Connecticut Civic Centre 
collapse 1978 
Analysis model neglected buckling and eccentricities  
Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse 1981  Error in assumption about how loads were distributed. 
Ramsgate Walkway collapse 1994 Error in assumption about moment on stub axle 
Sleipner oil recovery platform 
collapse 1991 
Inadequate FE mesh 
 
While we are very aware that structural calculations need to be carefully checked, the lesson to be 
learned from Table 1 and other major failures is that all the sub-processes of the modelling process 
(Figure 5) need to be assessed in a reflective way.  
 
 
BIM 
Building Information Modelling (BIM) is leading to automation in structural design. More 
importantly, it is an enabling technology for interdisciplinary working.  A fundamental aim is that 
each design discipline will be able to access the models of the other disciplines involved (BIM 2) or 
that all parties will access a central model (BIM 3).  In doing this, difficulties must arise, for example, 
in controlling revisions to the design. The brain has special ability to make associations and identify 
anomalies that is not replicable by software.  While seeking to use software in managing the 
processes, the brain must continue to be used as a main source for controlling uncertainty. The 
same reflective ethos as outlined in this paper needs to be applied to all processes whether or not 
the work is in a BIM environment. BIM software must be such that it is possible for designers to get 
ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ?tŚĂƚĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŵŽĚĞů ? ? ?tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƐŚĂƉĞ ? ? ?tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞďĞŶĚŝŶŐŵŽŵĞŶƚĚŝĂŐƌĂŵĨŽƌƚŚĂƚďĞĂŵ ? ? 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
A computer can do calculations and repeat them much more efficiently 
and accurately than is possible using brain power. Computer power also 
beats brain power at processing logic especially when the rule set is 
complex.   
    On the other hand, the deep associativity of knowledge and other 
features of the brain allows us to: identify patterns, make subtle 
inferences, understand, have hunches, ask penetrating questions, 
generate ideas, etc. Computer technology is a long way from replicating 
ƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶƚŽ ?ƚŚŝŶŬ ? ?
   If a process can be defined as a formal algorithm, to implement it on a 
computer is the sensible approach. Software should seek to help us in our thinking  W for example it 
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would have been possible that the software used for the Sleipner Platform model (Figure 5) had an 
embedded rule that flagged up the fault that led to the collapse  W but harnessing the thinking ability 
of the brain must remain a central activity in the design process.  This should work in partnership 
with formal quality management systems  W as discussed in the paper on page xx 
      The low incidence of major structural failures in the UK indicates that we do have  good checks 
and balances to prevent them.  But the key strategy of reflective thinking, that is at the core of good 
engineering practice and is very important in controlling risk, tends not to be explicitly addressed in 
education and training.  Failure of structures is, of course, just one of the risks that need to be 
controlled by such thinking. 
    I believe that that the ethos in which one operates, i.e. the thought processes that guide our 
thinking and actions5,6, is as important as technical knowledge in the pursuit of successful 
engineering outcomes. 
   Structural engineers who have not developed a reflective ethos in their work must seek to move in 
this direction. In education, teachers must seek to instil a reflective ethos in student project work. 
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